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ABSTRACT 
It is generally accepted that early determination of the stakeholder 
requirements assists in the development of systems that better 
meet the needs of those stakeholders. General security 
requirements frustrate this goal because it is difficult to determine 
how they affect the functional requirements of the system. 
This paper illustrates how representing threats as crosscutting 
concerns aids in determining the effect of security requirements 
on the functional requirements. Assets (objects that have value in 
a system) are first enumerated, and then threats on these assets are 
listed. The points where assets and functional requirements join 
are examined to expose vulnerabilities to the threats. Security 
requirements, represented as constraints, are added to the 
functional requirements to reduce the scope of the vulnerabilities. 
These requirements are used during the analysis and specification 
process, thereby incorporating security concerns into the 
functional requirements of the system. 
General Terms 
Management, Design, Reliability, Security. 
Keywords 
Security requirements, threats, assets, problem frames 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The security needs of a given system are often not determined 
until well into the implementation, resulting in late and expensive 
attempts to shoehorn security into the work in progress. 
Unfortunately, expressing specific security requirements is 
difficult. They tend to be stated as crosscutting concerns that 
impact many functional requirements. Moreover, security 
requirements are often stated in terms of how to achieve security 
(e.g. the system shall use cryptography) and not in terms of the 
problem to be solved, leaving it unclear how the security 
requirements affect the functional requirements. 
Security requirements are concerned with how assets are to be 
protected from harm [20]. An asset is something in the context of 
the system, tangible or not, that is to be protected [12]. A threat is 
the potential for abuse of an asset that will cause harm in the 
context of the problem. A vulnerability is a weakness in the 
system that an attack exploits. Security requirements are 
constraints on functional requirements intended to reduce the 
scope of vulnerabilities. Thus, security requirements stipulate the 
elimination of vulnerabilities that an attacker can exploit to carry 
out threats on assets, thereby causing harm. 
Aspect-oriented techniques seem to provide excellent tools for 
analyzing security requirements.  To use these techniques, we 
must first determine what crosscuts what, and then tease out the 
implications of this crosscutting. For our purposes, functional 
requirements form one set of concerns. Amongst other things, 
functional requirements describe how objects are transformed by 
the system. Another set of concerns are threat descriptions, which 
describe relationships between objects and threats. Join points are 
located where objects are shared by both threat descriptions and 
functional requirements; these objects are assets because they 
need to be protected. Vulnerabilities are found at join points by 
composing threats with functional requirements. The resulting 
advice is a set of security requirements that reduce the size of the 
vulnerability, protecting the assets.  
This paper presents an approach to deriving security requirements 
using aspect-oriented software development crosscutting concepts 
and problem frames [13]. Threat descriptions are composed with a 
problem frames representation of functional requirements, giving 
vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are ameliorated by security 
requirements. Security requirements are expressed as constraints 
on the functional requirements, making them a more natural part 
of the specification process, comparable with other constraints 
such as safety and cost [20]. Alternatively, they can be expressed 
as trust assumptions [8], which indicate that the security 
requirement is assumed to be satisfied in another context. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
provides some background information on problem frames and 
trust assumptions. Section 3 presents our approach to deriving 
security requirements, using a running example. Section 4 
presents related work, and section 5 describes conclusions and 
future work. 
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One note: our focus is on requirements. As such, we have put 
aside what today is probably the largest source of security 
problems: those that arise because of a ‘faulty’ implementation 
[23, 27]. Examples include the infamous buffer overflow; 
incorrect and incomplete input validation, especially in HTML 
forms; and faulty error handling. 
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
We use problem frames [13] as a tool to organize information to 
facilitate derivation of security requirements. This section presents 
some background information on problem frames, along with a 
discussion of requirements and specifications in a problem frames 
context. 
When delving into security issues, analysts must ‘look outside the 
box’. In the problem frames context, this means that given 
properties must not be overly trusted, and that the analyst must be 
willing to include architectural considerations in their reflections. 
This challenge is further discussed below. 
This section concludes with a short discussion of trust 
assumptions, which we use to narrow the context within which 
threat analysis is performed. There is a brief discussion about 
what they are, why they are useful, and where they come from. 
2.1 Problem Frames 
Problem frames [13] are a tool used during problem analysis. 
Problem frames provide a shape of a solution for various problem 
classes. When using problem frames, the analyst decomposes 
larger problems into a collection of smaller ones, where each 
subproblem fits one of the basic problem frames. These 
subproblems are later recomposed, providing the solution for the 
original problem. 
In a problem frames context, a requirements engineer describes 
problems by describing the interaction of domains that exist in the 
world. The problem frames notation captures domains in a 
problem along with the interconnections between them. For 
example, assume that the requirements elicitation process for a 
box that protects documents from fire produces the requirement 
open the fireproof box when a door-open button is pushed. Figure 
1 illustrates one set of domains that could satisfy the requirement: 
a basic automatic door system with three domains, two of which 
are given and one of which is designed. One given domain is the 
box’s door mechanism domain, capable of opening and shutting 
the box’s door. The second given domain is the one requesting 
that the door be opened; this domain includes both the ‘button’ to 
be pushed and the human pushing the button. The designed 
domain is the machine, the domain that will bridge the gap 
between the other two domains in order to fulfill the requirement 
that the door open when the button is pushed. The oval presents 
the requirement that the machine is to satisfy. 
Every domain has interfaces, which are defined by the phenomena 
visible to other domains. Phenomena (e.g. events and signals) are 
visible: they can be observed. The notation shows the phenomena 
shared between two domains on the line between the domains, 
along with indicating which domain controls the phenomena. In 
Figure 1, the Person + Button domain above produces the event 
phenomena ButtonDown and ButtonUp, as indicated in the 
diagram. Alternatively, the designer could have chosen to produce 
a single event: OpenDoor. The Control Machine produces the 
Boolean phenomena MotorOpen and MotorClose (turn on and off 
the motor) on the interface between the machine and the Door 
Mechanism. The Door Mechanism produces the Boolean 
phenomena DoorIsOpen and DoorIsClosed. 
Requirements are optative, describing desired behavior instead of 
existing behavior [13]. Descriptions of the desired behavior of 
individual parts of the system (the designed domains) are also 
optative. Descriptions of the actual behavior of given domains 
(their phenomena: inputs, outputs, and states visible at their 
interfaces) are indicative; they describe an “objective truth” about 
the behavior of the domain. 
2.1.1 Requirements and Specifications 
According to Zave and Jackson [30], a requirement is an optative 
description of what the system is to do. Requirements describe a 
desired effect, or a goal. Jackson [13] describes a requirement as 
“the effects in the problem domain that […] the machine is to 
guarantee.” Van Lamsweerde’s [14] approach is similar, defining 
a goal as “an objective the system under consideration should 
achieve” and then saying that a requirement is a goal that can be 
achieved by an agent in the software-to-be [16]. The i* framework 
uses a comparable definition: goals model the intentions of 
stakeholders [2]. 
Again referring to Zave & Jackson, specifications are about 
phenomena. The specification of an individual domain is a 
description of the behavior of the domain in terms of its 
phenomena, indicative and optative, visible at its interface. The 
specification of a system is the collection of domain specifications 
that together permit the fulfillment of the requirement(s). 
The distinction between requirement and specification is an 
important one, especially when working with security 
requirements. A security requirement does not describe how 
security is to be implemented, but instead describes what is 
desired. It is the specification that describes how, in terms of its 
externally visible phenomena, the requirement is fulfilled. For 
example, the information on the network will be encrypted with 
Blowfish is not a security requirement, but is instead a 
specification. The underlying requirement would be something 
resembling information shared at the interface of the domains in 
this problem is not to be generally understandable. 
2.1.2 Indicative vs. Optative 
Indicative domain properties are normally expected to be constant, 
e.g. the same stimulus in the same context produces the same 
response. This is what Jackson meant by “objective truth” [13]. 
Unfortunately, when reasoning about security we should put aside 
this nice concept and assume that all domain properties are 
optative. Consider the pushbutton in the domain shown in Figure 
1; when the button is pushed, the circuit connected to the button is 
closed. This would seem to be an indicative property. Now put 
some confidential information in the box, and then consider the 
same button from the point of view of an attacker. The attacker 
might cut the wire, connect an alternate or second button to the 
wire, or put a circuit in the middle that analyzes the context of the 
button push and either passes it on or doesn’t. The property can no 
Control 
Machine
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longer be considered objectively true. It has become optative: 
what we want to be true. 
Security requirements (the constraints) are optative, describing 
characteristics of the system that the requirements engineer 
desires to be true. The lesson learned from the above discussion is 
that, unlike functional requirements, security requirements should 
assume that indicative domain properties are optative, because a 
goal of an attacker might be to change the behavior of some 
indicative phenomena. A successful attack means one of two 
things: phenomena exist that were not described in the problem, or 
phenomena behavior (the specification) assumed to be indicative 
(to be true), is not1. 
2.2 Parallel Elaboration of Requirements & 
Architecture 
The Twin Peaks model [21] shows that the elaboration of 
requirements and architecture should proceed in parallel, each 
influencing the other. This is doubly true in the context of security 
requirements, because security is a systems problem [20]. One 
cannot accurately determine the security requirements outside the 
context of the system.  
To illustrate the idea, consider a trivial functional requirement 
business proposals shall be stored electronically using a format 
defined by the customer. In addition, assume the existence of the 
general security requirement business proposals are to be treated 
as company-confidential information. Without knowing the 
domains involved in the problem, how do we know how to keep 
the information confidential? We can postulate the existence of 
computers used to write and store the proposals, but we cannot go 
much further. The designer could choose to put the machines in a 
locked room, in which case the room key becomes a phenomenon 
in the problem and the security requirements must describe the 
constraints on obtaining and using a key. Alternatively, the 
designer might specify a client/server architecture in which the 
client machines are publicly accessible. In this case, the client 
machine domain can be physically accessed by anyone and the 
proposals are potentially visible where the client and server 
domains connect (the network). The security requirements must 
describe constraints on who can use the client machine and on 
who can ‘see’ the information where the domains connect. 
It is highly likely that applying a security requirement to a 
problem will create subproblems, add domains to the existing 
problem, or both. For example, the specification to fulfill a 
security requirement information shared between the client and 
server domain must not be accessible must be evaluated in terms 
of visible phenomena. The designer must assure either that 
information shared between the domains is not visible outside the 
problem or that ‘seeing’ what passes between the domains does 
not reveal the information. Either way, the physical properties of 
the connection need to be described.  
2.3 Trust Assumptions 
A trust assumption is a decision to trust the given properties of 
some domain and to go no further in the analysis [8]. Trust 
                                                                
1 These two positions could be reduced to one. The argument 
would be that attack does not alter the behavior of existing 
phenomena. Instead, new phenomena are created, thus changing 
the problem. This distinction is not important for this paper. 
assumptions are used to bound the context of a problem, limiting 
the number of domains that are directly involved in the analysis.  
We use the definition of trust proposed by Grandison & Sloman 
[6]: “[Trust] is the quantified belief by a trustor with respect to 
the competence, honesty, security and dependability of a trustee 
within a specified context”. In our context, we say that the analyst 
trusts that some domain will participate competently and honestly 
in the satisfaction of a constraint.  
An example should help clarify the use and utility of trust 
assumptions. Assume that an analyst ensures confidentiality of 
some information using a locked-room approach. The analyst is 
probably assuming that the corporate key-giver will ensure that 
keys are given only to authorized individuals. However, the key-
giver may be required to respect a safety constraint, meaning that 
keys must be provided to the fire department and/or the safety 
officer(s). These people may not be authorized to see the 
information kept in the room. The conflict renders the analyst’s 
assumption invalid. Making the assumption explicit would 
improve the chances that such conflicts are noticed. 
3. USING THREAT DESCRIPTIONS 
Section 1 introduced the idea that the crosscutting relationship 
between threat descriptions and functional requirements 
represented by problem frames provides us with join points. The 
join points represent potential vulnerabilities; a composition 
process is used to convert ‘potential’ into ‘actual’. This section 
describes the composition of threat descriptions with functional 
requirements to derive security requirements. 
A threat description is a descriptive phrase of the form performing 
action X on/to asset Y could cause harm Z. Some examples: 
• Exposing the company’s business plan could cause loss of 
revenue. 
• Altering the balance of an account could cause financial loss. 
• Destroying the village in the valley could cause loss of life. 
A threat description can be represented in a prescriptive form by 
inverting and negating the phrase. For example, the first example 
above would become avoid loss of revenue by preventing the 
exposure of the company’s business plan. Representing threat 
description in both descriptive and prescriptive forms might help 
an analyst be more certain that all the implications of the threat 
descriptions have been determined. 
A threat description may be represented by a tuple (threat, asset), 
where the tuple element ‘threat’ is itself a tuple (action, harm). 
The first threat description example is shown in tuple form below. 
( )( )plan business  , revenue of loss exposing,  
It is important to note that the action in a threat description is the 
inversion of some common security goal, such as confidentiality 
(further discussed below). The action is not intended to describe 
an attack, which is an act (or sequence of acts) of an attacker 
carried out to exploit a vulnerability and therefore carry out a 
threat. For example, an attacker might carry out the first threat 
above by diverting the business plan to a second printer while it is 
being printed. The diversion is the attack, exploiting what is 
probably a vulnerability in the network. 
3.1 Description of the Example 
A common example is used throughout this section to illustrate 
the concepts. Space constraints force the example to be small and 
somewhat contrived. The example consists of a small Human 
Resources system having four functional requirements. A problem 
context diagram, showing the initial set of domains to be used by 
the problem frame diagrams, is shown in Figure 2. The 
requirements are: 
• REQ1: Salary, personal, and benefits information can be 
entered, changed, and deleted. This information is stored for 
eventual use in producing paychecks. 
• REQ2: A subset of his or her own personal and benefits 
information will be available to each managerial employee 
for perusal. 
• REQ3: An ‘address list’ subset of personal information 
consisting of the employee’s name, office, and work 
telephone number will be generally available. 
• REQ4: All information will be backed up daily. 
We postulate the existence of three general security requirements:  
• Salary information is highly confidential and is to be shown 
only to authorized individuals. 
• Personal and benefits information shall be restricted to the 
employee and to others with a need to see it. 
• The ‘address list’ of employees of the company is company 
confidential. 
Finally, we find one general requirement: 
• The system shall not be expensive to administer. 
Figures 3 through 5 present subproblem diagrams for the first 
three functional requirements. Phenomena are not included in the 
diagrams, but will be added later where needed. 
As noted in section 1, each functional requirement is a concern, 
and is represented by a subproblem. The domains in the 
subproblem diagrams are a projection of the domains in the 
context, meaning that each subproblem/concern contains a subset 
of domains in the context. Domains contain (or are themselves) 
objects. Thus each subproblem represents a set of objects that 
crosscut the threat descriptions, revealing the join points. Figure 6 
shows theses sets by marking the domains in the context (from 
Figure 2) with the the subproblem they appear in. The names R1, 
R2, and R3 represent REQ1, REQ2, and REQ3, respectively. 
3.2 Overview of the Composition Process 
Deriving the security requirements is an iterative process. Each 
iteration recomposes the threats (the threat descriptions) with the 
functional requireme
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Identify candidate assets, or objects in the problem context 
that might participate in a threat. 
descriptions. An asset is an object that participates in a threat. 
Determine the crosscutting relationships between threat 
descriptions and functional requirements. Look for whether an 
asset is in a domain involved in the subproblem, ending up 
with the set of tup
({ subproblem  asset,  threat,  
Compose the threat with the subprob
there is a vulnerability that permits fulfillm
associated with the asset. Enumerate constraints on the 
functional requirements to weaken the vulnerability to an 
acceptable level. 
4. Identify conflicts. 
Each of these steps is presented below. 
ing a mechanical process. It must be noted that we are not describ
There is no crank that, when turned, produces the answer. Steps 
are approximate and can be combined. Depending on the problem, 
sub-iterations might be required. Finally, the skill and experience 
of the analyst is crucial. 
3.3 Details of the Composition Process 
3.3.1 Identify Candidate Assets 
The goal of this step is to find all the objects in the context of the 
problem that might have value, directly or indirectly. In general, 
these consist of all the information objects stored in or accessed 
by the system-to-be and any tangible objects such as 
computers themselves. An object is has direct value when the 
potential harm caused by a threat is to the object itself. An object 
has indirect value when a threat involving that asset causes harm 
somewhere else, such as to revenue, to cos
object can have both direct and indirect value; when money is 
taken from a bank, it loses both the money and its reputation. 
One potential asset might contain, or enclose, other potential 
assets. A good example is a database that contains individual 
information assets. Another example
contain any number of information assets. 
When using problem frames, listing t
straightforward. They are the do
problem context. For our examp
Personal Information, Benefits 
Device, Backup Media, and People. 
Because of space limitations, this paper restricts the discussion to 
threats involving information assets. 
3.3.2 Identifying Threats 
3.3.2.1 Security Concerns 
In general, harm is caused by the negation of one or more security 
concerns. For information assets, these concerns are described as 
CIA: confidentiality, integrity, and availability [23]. The concerns 
are similar for tangible assets: exposure, modification, and 
deprivation (theft or destruction). 
Confidentiality concerns are about restricting access to 
information, and are applied to information assets or information 
to be garnered from p
privacy incorporates as an additional concern the use one makes 
of an information asset, and is not discussed in this paper. 
Authentication is related to confidentiality, and is concerned with 
ensuring that users are who they say they are, and remain so 
during the ‘session’.  
Integrity is concerned with ensuring that an asset is not modified 
without authorization. This concern covers sever
including direct modification of data, modification through 
unauthorized transactions, indirect modification using backup 
media, and transient modification before it is displayed to a user. 
Non-repudiation, where a person cannot claim after the fact to 
have not performed some act, is related to integrity. 
Availability concerns are about e
(available) when it is supposed to be. For example, cutting power 
to a computer makes it unavailable. If access is over a network 
then anything that blocks data movement on the network will 
affect availability. Clearly, physically removing an asset also 
affects availability (deprivation). 
These concerns affect every object 
each other. For example, availability supports confidentiality 
when the object in question is a physical asset. Having the asset 
stolen makes it unavailable and allows the thief to know any 
information associated with the asset.  
3.3.2.2 Using the Concerns 
The concerns are used to enumerate the threat descriptions. One 
asks questions of the form “what harm could come from violating 
the [insert concern here] of [insert object here]?” Answers to these 
questions are threat descriptions. 
Threats can have a ‘time’ element, stating that the harm will occur 
only if the violation occurs before or after some point, or within 
some interval. For example
confidential (and therefore valuable) only up to the moment it is 
made public. The time element is important when looking for and 
countering vulnerabilities, as it gives an indication of how severe 
a given vulnerability is and what measures are appropriate for 
countering the vulnerability. 
We note again that an object may not have any value in itself, but 
instead is valued by the harm indirectly caused to something else. 
For example, information abo
redecorate the company president’s office has no intrinsic value, 
but may be highly valued because exposing the figure could 
damage the reputation of the company. In other words, when 
evaluating how assets are associated with threats, one must look 
for direct and indirect effects. 
Remember that the initial set of assets came from the problem 
frames context. Threat descriptions indicate which threats involve 
which assets. Assets are (contained within) the domains in the 
context. Subproblems operate upon these assets (domains). 
Therefore threats crosscut subproblems, with the assets as
points. Any subproblem that incorporates an asset might contain 
vulnerabilities allowing the threats associated with that asset to be 
consummated. If analysis locates a vulnerability in a subproblem, 
then security requirements must be added to the subproblem to 
reduce the size of the vulnerability to an acceptable level. 
A domain that is a projection of more than one domain found in 
the problem context can contain multiple assets. Actions on the 
domain as a whole must be analyzed as if they operate on the 
component assets. For example, consider a database domain in a 
backup/recovery subproblem. The database contains the 
ts. If one of the contained assets is 
Con
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The analyst begins by listing the subproblems being considered
individual information asse
related to a threat involving integrity, then the domain itself is 
related to that threat and must be analyzed in that context. A threat 
against salary information will also be a threat against backup 
media containing salary information. 
3.3.2.3 The Example 
tinuing the example, asking questions about the object salary 
mation might produce the following threat descriptions (only 
 threats are named for use later):  
• (Confidentiality) Releasing salary information to 
unauthorized individuals could damage the company’s 
reputation. Additionally, it increases costs by making 
‘employee theft’ by competitors easier. This is threat 1 (T1). 
(Integrity) Unauthorized changes could increase costs by 
increasing the size of the payroll and damage reputation by 
provoking lawsuits or involving police. This is threat 2 (T2). 
• (Availability) Denying access could damage the company’s 
reputation, reduce employee motivation, and incur damage 
payments for employees who were not paid on
Similar answers can be found for personal informatio
 information. In particular, note that release of pe
information to unauthorized individuals results in the same harm 
as T1: name this new threat threat 3 (T3).  
The analysis results in threat des
((Release, damage reputation), salary information) 
domain, we determine: 
• (Confidentiality) Exposing the machine could result in the 
information on its disks being exposed, resulting in the harm 
described above. 
• (Integrity) Modifying (or replacing
result in the harm described above. 
(Availability) Destroying the machine can res
access to information, resulting in the harm described above. 
king at the backup device, we see: 
• Replacing the device with one that makes covert copies can 
result in exposure of all the information assets. 
Causing the device to modify information before it is written 
to backup media can result in the integrity harm described 
earlier. 
• Causing the device to write incorrect backups, when coupled 
with destruction of the machine, could trigg
harm described earlier. 
Looking at backup media, we can conclude that all of 
information assets can be triggered through ex
 of the backups. alteration, or destruction
Figure 7 is a copy of Figure 6, annotated with the domains 
involved with the three named threats T1, T2, and T3. 
3.3.3 Determine Crosscutting Relationships 
3.3.3.1 Discussion 
The previous step identified the threat descriptions: threats and the 
assets that participate in the threats. One must now determine how 
the threat descriptions crosscut the subproblems to determine 
which threats apply to a given subproblem; this step locates the 
join points. The join points are analyzed, king for 
vulnerabilities that might allow the threat to come  pass. If 
vulnerabilities are found, then security requirements are generated 
to reduce the vulnerability. 
 
and identifying the assets in each subproblem. This connects one 
concern, the subproblems, with the assets in the subproblem, 
producing a set of tuples of the form ( ){ }subproblem asset, . This set 
and the threat descriptions described above (the set ( ){ }asset threat, ) 
are combined using a natural join (represented by the X operator) 
to find the set of join points. 
( ){ } ( ){ } ( ){ }subproblem asset,    asset threat,subproblem asset, threat, X=  
For small problems such as the examples in this paper, generating 
the set of tuples informally is sufficient. When working with 
larger problems, generating the tuples and performing the join will 
help ensure that nothing is forgotten. 
For each tuple (join point), the analyst looks at the domains in the 
subproblem to determine whether they create vulnerabilities. For 
example, consider the domain ‘person + button’ in the subproblem 
shown in Figure 1. If the safe contains confidential information, 
then a threat exists involving an unauthorized person viewing that 
information. The very structure of the subproblem allows the 
threat to be realized. There is no way to restrict who uses the 
button, because the only phenomena visible are related to the 
he interfaces between domains and in 
button itself. To fix the problem one must either a) restrict the 
people who can get to the button through some external means, b) 
separate the person domain from the button domain and add 
appropriate authentication phenomena between the person domain 
and the machine, or c) add authentication phenomena at the 
existing interface. In cases b & c, appropriate domains to access 
authentication information must be added, which could easily 
create new vulnerabilities. 
After being satisfied that the domain structure is valid, the analyst 
looks for vulnerabilities at t
the phenomena shared across them. Can threats be realized 
through eavesdropping on phenomena? Are there connection 
domains that are not modeled, such as networks? Do the 
phenomena have physical properties that make them vulnerable, 
such as electromagnetic or power usage signatures? Are there 
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recorded and played back? 
It is not sufficient to look only at the domains containing the 
threatened assets. There might be indirect vulnerabilities where 
interfaces between two different domains allow the threat on the 
asset domain to be carried out, as shown by the ‘person + button’ 
example discussed above. All domains in the subproblem must be 
examined, as must the domains in other subproblems that 
eventually recompose with the subproblem under examination. 
If examination reveals a vulne
requirement must be added to the subproblem. For example, if a 
replay vulnerability exists (a phenomena sequence can be 
recorded, and the replayed to produce some harm), then the 
requirement replays must be detected and ignored must be added. 
If a connection domain between domains X and Y is vulnerable to 
eavesdropping, then the requirement information phenomena 
between domains X and Y must not be understandable by an 
eavesdropper must be added. 
Unless new requirements are satisfied using trust assumptions, 
their satisfaction will probably involve changing the visible 
phenomena and could involve changing the domain structure of 
the subproblem. New domains might create new subproblems. 
New phenomena could change design decisions. These changes 
could create new assets and/or new vulnerabilities. Probably a 
turn through the requirements/architecture spiral will be required. 
Certainly the threats analysis must be repeated. 
Iterations through the process can add domains to the overall 
problem context. This happens because the analyst must look 
further and further down through the phenomena chain to ensure 
that the requirements are b
analyst is unwilling or una
process is too difficult, the expected return too small, or because 
the problem is believed solved in another context. The analyst 
uses trust assumptions at th
analyst’s beliefs
context can be trusted to an acceptable level. By using a trust 
assumption, the analyst is putting bounds on the problem that the 
system-to-be must solve. 
3.3.3.2 The Example 
Turning to our examples, we see that every problem is affected by 
at least one of the threats.  
Problem REQ1 
Starting with Figure 3, Payroll Data, we see that all
named threats T1, T2, and T3 relate to assets contained in the 
projection domain ‘Sal, Pers, Ben Info’. The fact that the ‘user’ 
can apparently be anyone clearly creates a vulnerability, so we 
add the constraint only HR staff can edit or view information. We 
do not have enough information to know whether or not there are 
vulnerabilities at the interfaces; we need to see the phenomena 
including any needed to meet the above constraint. Turnin
designer, we obtain a subproblem diagram with the designer’s 
chosen authentication scheme, as shown in Figure 8. 
From this diagram we conclude that the interface between the user 
and the machine seems safe. We are told that the Authentication 
Data and Information domains are supplied domains and not to be 
designed as part of this effort. However, there is a public network 
between the machines being used to process the data and the data 
itself. We must add the requirement information passing over the 
network must not be understandable by an eavesdropper. 
When confronted with the problem, the designer produced the 
diagram shown in Figure 9. 
We note the encrypted network, and immediately add a constraint 
encryption keys must not be revealed. Asking the designer about 
the keys, we are told that a key exchange protocol will not be 
used, that the keys are physically built into the machines, and that 
the machines can be trusted not to reveal them2. Noting that 
problems REQ1 and REQ2 both access the informa
but with different secur
properties of the two given domains, Info and Authentication 
Data. We need to know how they control what information they 
release to a client on the network. We are told that it is the 
encryption key that tells the domains what information they may 
release. We are told further that t
responsibility of the IT organization and physically and logically 
secure: we do not need to worry about them. These assurances 
translate into trust assumptions, shown in Figure 10. 
Problem REQ2 
Reasoning about REQ2, employee access to personal and benefits 
information, is very similar to the above, except that the 
population of authorized users is much larger and the salary 
information must not be displayed.  
2 The assumptions in this paragraph are unrealistic and naïve, but 
are acceptable for this paper. 
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Analyzing this problem will result in a combination of the results 
of REQ1 (above) and REQ3 (below). For space reasons the 
argument and diagrams are not included in this paper. 
Problem REQ3 
There are two threats that can affect REQ3, the address book. The 
first is that allowing the address information to leave the company 
can cause harm (T3). The second is that if the machine prepares 
the address list by using the larger data assets, it might be possible 
to carry out the threats involving these assets (T1). When 
provoked, the designer produces the diagram shown in Figure 11. 
The same encrypted network is being used in this subproblem as 
thentication phenomena to the 
er and the system, so we have not 
on led to the realization that because 
 company buildings, in theory 
ency workers could access the 
was used in the payroll data subproblem, but with different keys, 
so we will need to eventually add the same trust assumptions. The 
analyst was told that because different encryption keys are used, 
no information in the Salary and Benefits Information domains is 
accessible. Thus no vulnerability exists that could permit carrying 
out threats against these more confidential data assets. Also, 
because the keys are different, the Info Display machine cannot 
expose confidential data ‘lifted’ from the network. A trust 
assumption is added to capture this information. 
The designer has not added au
interaction between the us
resolved that threat. The designer says that the company uses 
many agency workers and that it is impractical to give all such 
workers a username & password: doing so would cost far too 
much money. The security officer says that the information must 
be protected. The requirements, reasonable cost and appropriate 
security, are in conflict. The conflict is resolved below. 
3.3.4 Resolving Conflicts 
3.3.4.1 Discussion 
Security requirements often conflict with each other, as well as 
with other requirements. For example, the result of applying the 
CIA concerns can conflict with revenue & ease-of-use. Viega and 
McGraw [27] provide an example from the credit card world, 
saying that the credit card companies know ways to reduce fraud 
dramatically, but they do not use them because the cost of 
business lost would exceed the loss caused by the fraud.  
3.3.4.2 The Example 
The address-list display problem brought out a conflict between 
administration cost and security. Discussions between the security 
officer and the IT organizati
the system was limited to inside
only company employees and ag
system. This satisfied the security officer, so a trust assumption 
that the building security system restricts the membership of the 
user domain to employees was added. The completed diagram is 
shown in Figure 12. 
There is seldom a clear-cut answer to a conflict. The analyst must 
make decisions based on estimates of risk and cost. Work to assist 
the analyst with these decisions is in progress, and will be 
presented in a future paper. 
4. RELATED WORK 
Rashid et al propose that ideas from aspect-oriented software 
development can be used when mapping non-functional 
requirements onto functional requirements [24, 25]. They start by 
identifying the non-functional requirements (NFRs) that affect 
more than one functional requirement, determine what the effect 
of the overlap is, then model the composition of the requirements. 
In their work, security is treated identically to other NFRs. Their 
work is more general than the work presented in this paper. It 
focuses on managing the interplay and the results of composition 
of the requirements, not deriving requirements from the NFRs.  
van Lamsweerde et al use “obstacles” to model security & safety 
[16] in KAOS, and are developing the notion of anti-goals to 
Figure 11 – REQ3’ – Address list 
Display 
Information 
Person 
Info 
Display 
Machine Addr Info Encr. 
Net 
Keys are 
secure
EN!data(KeyInfData) 
IE!data(KeyInfData) 
Figure 12 – REQ3’’ – Address list 
Display 
Information 
Employee 
Info 
Display 
Machine
Keys are 
secure
Building Sec. 
System 
Restricts domain membership 
Addr Info Encr. 
Net 
EN!data(KeyInfData) 
IE!data(KeyInfData) 
Sal & Ben 
Info 
Keys restrict 
access
Figure 10 – REQ1’’’ – Payroll data 
DDisplay 
Information 
User 
Info 
Display 
Machine 
Sal, Pers, 
Ben info
Info 
Editing 
Machine 
U!credentials (name, pw) 
Encrypted 
Network 
Authentication 
Data
Keys are 
secure 
Domains are 
secure 
EN!data(KeySalData) 
ID!data(KeySalData) 
plus Authentication 
EN!data(KeySalData) 
IE!data(KeySalData) 
plus Authentication 
describe and close vulnerabilities [15]. In KAOS one starts with 
generic “root anti-goals” which are the inversions of CIA (plus 
 to functional requirements. We speculate 
verage. 
design 
g 
tation concerns. Neither 
ith other constraints when 
e. The composition process 
thers (e.g. anti-goals in 
elp an 
r the effort to reduce a given 
6. 
The efully 
ackn
Jackson for their
and 
Alis e 
appr , whose 
com
e 
ken, Switzerland, 4-8 Jun 
[3] 
g 
 
," In 
privacy) and determines which agents could benefit from 
application of the anti-goals, while we start with asset 
identification and then determine the threats involving the assets. 
The approaches converge at the end. In KAOS one adds ‘avoid’ 
predicates to close the vulnerabilities, while in this work security 
constraints are added
that in KAOS, concentrating on who benefits (as opposed to what 
can be attacked) and the closed nature of the domain model will 
tend to limit the vulnerabilities found during generation of the 
anti-model. More work is required to determine and compare the 
expressive powers of each approach. 
Alexander is looking at detecting vulnerabilities using misuse 
cases [1], as is Sindre et al [26]. McDermott uses ‘abuse cases’ 
[19]. In and Boehm have adapted the WinWin framework to 
include security requirements [11], and  Heitmeyer has done the 
same with SCR [10]. 
Several teams are looking at the role of trust in security 
requirements engineering. In the i* framework [28, 29], Yu et al 
take an ‘actor, intention, goal’ approach where security and trust 
relationships within the model are modeled as “softgoals”: goals 
that depend on another actor to satisfy them. The Tropos project 
[5] uses the i* framework, adding on wider lifecycle co
Neither model captures the analyst’s assumptions about the 
domains that make up the solution to the problem. As such, an i* 
model complements the framework presented here, and in fact can 
be used to determine the initial goals, requirements, and 
constraints. 
He and Antón [9] are concentrating on privacy, proposing a 
context-based access model. Context is determined using purpose 
(why is information being accessed), conditions (what conditions 
must be satisfied before access can be granted), and “obligations” 
(what actions must be taken before access can be granted. 
Clark and Walker [3] describe how a class of crosscutting 
concerns can be incorporated into a system design by usin
composition patterns. The work describes how one might use the 
patterns to satisfy requirements that normally lead to a scattered 
and/or tangled implementation. Grundy [7] represents ‘needs’ and 
‘provides’ requirements between components using an aspect 
approach. The work is solidly situated in design and 
implementation, permitting reasoning about collections of 
components that satisfy certain implemen
Clark and Walker nor Grundy discuss derivation of requirements, 
but instead focus on satisfying requirements already known. 
5. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
We have shown how representing security requirements as 
crosscutting threat descriptions assists with composing these 
requirements with the functional requirements. Composition, an 
iterative process, gives us a set of constraints on the functional 
requirements, which we call security requirements. Security 
requirements are analyzed along w
producing specifications for the problem. 
The principal advantage of our approach is that it permits 
conversion of general security requirements into something more 
akin to functional requirements. The constraints apply to specific 
functional requirements, much as other constraints such as those 
related to safety do. All of the constraints can be considered 
together and in the context of a particular requirement. The 
crosscutting nature of the threat descriptions permits consistency 
analysis to ensure that assets are treated uniformly and 
appropriately throughout the system. 
Much work remains to be don
described in this paper is informal. It would be useful to have 
some traceability between constraints and the threat(s) they 
counter; we are looking at the representation Rashid et al propose 
in [24] and at an adaptation of the multi-dimensional concerns 
matrix proposed by Ossher and Tarr in their work describing on-
demand application remodularization [22]. Better integration with 
some of our colleagues’ research, such as the organizational 
access control work of Crook [4] and the abuse analysis work of 
Lin [17], is desired. As noted in the related work section, the 
expressive powers of this approach and o
[15]) need to be better understood. 
A principal future focus will be the introduction of cost and risk 
into the approach described by this paper. Quantifying the levels 
of trust in trust assumptions and the levels of harm in threat 
descriptions provides a starting point for calculating the potential 
risk associated with a vulnerability. Add the notion of cost or 
difficulty to constraints intended to reduce a vulnerability, and we 
have a way to compare the cost of closing a vulnerability with the 
expected harm if nothing is done. This information could h
analyst determine whethe
vulnerability is appropriate or necessary. 
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